Page 160 - MDSL Final

MARITIME DOCTRINE OF SRI LANKA
Poise

Maritime force could remain in station for an extended period of time
both covertly and overtly based on the situation. During the time in
station, they have the option to do what is best suited for a particular
situation. They will be allowed to seize the initiative, act as a force for
coercion or deterrence. The ability for forces to poise in international
waters gives them an added advantage over land and air forces to avoid
the military risk.

When the Task Force of four ships were sailed to attack the
enemy floating warehouses deep in the South of Sri Lanka in
September 2007, a tactical decision was taken by the OTC of
Task Force at a meeting convened during replenishment, to
use concentration of force and attack targets when detected
using the fire power of all four ships. However, almost
simultaneously, when the first echo of a ship was spotted
by Task Group 1, another target was detected by Task Group
2. As the second target appeared to be stationary, OTC
directed Task Group 2 to remain in poise to get the best
advantage. SLN was successful in destroying both enemy
floating warehouses one after another making advantage of
the attribute poise.

Lift Capacity

Major operations require maritime support to deploy, withdraw, maintain,
and reinforce military capabilities and requirements. Airpower could be
only used for rapid, quick, limited and short term operations. The most
practical and economical way of achieving the above requirements is to
sealift with the inherent quality of carrying volumes and sustainability
for long duration. Sealift capability enables the land and amphibious
forces to transit and poise offshore during the operations.

142 To Nurture a Stable Environment at Sea