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NAVSTRAT-2030 NAVSTRAT-2030

Focal Areas of Interest

Meanwhile, following provides a synoptic illustration of the SLN’s evolution since 1980 to date. Understanding our existing capabilities, capacity deficiencies and operational challenges led to the
conceptualization of our role in maritime affairs on our coasts, littorals, the IOR and beyond. Thus,
Table 11.1 it is imperative that the SLN re-orientate its focus on the following Focal Areas of Interest which
Synoptic View of SLN Evolution (1980 Onwards) underscores our Navy’s objectives in our maritime domain.

Sr. Description 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 As at 31
No Dec 23  Achieving MDA
1 Total no. of Personnel 2,691 7,426 19,144 52,828 48,526 44,533  Ensuring maritime safety and security
(including VNF)  Maritime law enforcement ensuring ‘Rules based good order at sea’
 Protection of living, non-living resources, littoral, EEZ and continental shelf
Officers 224 497 2,165 2,399 3,341 3,175 Management
Sailors 2,409 6,771 16,979 50, 429 45,185 41,358  Conducting Maritime Search and Rescue
Approved Cadre: 2,960 9,419 16,191 55,000 55,000 53,000  Responding to HADR
2 Total no of Volunteer 58 158 2,048 9,865 11,056 11,157  Port operations and critical infrastructure security
Forces  Improving defence and deterrence
VSS - - - 5,399 4,139 6,472  Nurturing enduring partnerships with local, regional and global entities for
3 Portion of National collective challenges without military alliances
Budget (LKR) 0.11 bn 1.14 bn 7.8 bn 31.08 bn 56.37 bn 81.3 bn  Cyber security
 CBRN preparedness
 Providing better health, nourishment, and welfare facilities
Recurrent to Capital 46: 54 65: 35 56: 44 87 : 13 91 : 9 85 : 15  Providing high quality training and retention of the best men and women
Expenditure ratio  Public awareness and support for maritime affairs

In order to anticipate associated risks above appraised and the threats identified to national security Weighing our Fleet, Basin Structure and People
with an appreciation of our strategic circumstances, following deficiencies and challenges were Our seas are today congested and contested. In order to respond to the persisting maritime threats,
identified existing in our capabilities and capacities in ensuring a safer and secure Sri Lanka; challenges in our domain and the evolving strategic environmental dynamics and realities, SLN

must seek a new seaward orientation. Acquiring capabilities to meet future demands is not a choice
Enduring Deficiencies and Operational Challenges but a necessity. This is easier said than done given the existing financial constraints. However, in

Our understanding into the strategic environment, global dynamics, historical precedence and in order to facilitate Sri Lanka’s pursuit of national interests, SLN is the ideal lead organization in
the IOR has prompted a strategic appraisal into our enduring deficiencies and operational our maritime frontier. Our defence orientation is non-aggression but concentrated on developing
challenges as an element of national power and a maritime stakeholder. Following are not listed credible defence, deterrence and maintaining ‘Rules based good order at sea’.
on priority basis; Our understanding of the enduring focal areas of interest has made us realize that the existing

● Lack of credible 3 dimensional capabilities capabilities and capacities are insufficient and the fleet is acutely equipped to achieve a desired
● Operational readiness (to be at least over 75 %) effect in our domain.
● Versatile platforms to conduct efficient and effective maritime security operations Fleet
● Capability and capacity for SAR, HADR and respond to pandemics
● Managing and law enforcement in the maritime domain The existing ‘fleet’ has a core complement of over 3,600 personnel. The 08 capital ships; AOPVs
● Real-time MDA capability and OPVs are severely short of credible surface capabilities (surveillance, reconnaissance) let
● Effective contribution towards enduring national and international partnerships for alone self-defence. These vessels are under- equipped and lacks versatility and flexibility in order
collective security challenges to be deployed for various maritime security operations /missions. Apart from conducting routine
● Safety and security of port operations, approaches and critical infrastructure high sea patrols these platforms are underutilized due to existing sensory, weaponry and
● Credible defence and deterrence capabilities equipment limitations. None of these ships does possess subsurface detection, electronic warfare
● Morale, suitability of personnel, recruitment, retention and training or anti-air capabilities that are essential configurations and integral for a balanced Navy.
● Public awareness and support for maritime affairs The state of auxiliaries is also a concern, seriously constraining our ability to conduct effective
sustained operations at sea. Almost all the auxiliaries are employed beyond their general life cycle.
In fact, the void of a sufficiently capable auxiliary fleet is a critical vulnerability overall.

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