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NAVSTRAT-2030 NAVSTRAT-2030

Meanwhile, the FMVs, the FGBs and the FACs are serving and deployed beyond their respective Understanding Our Approach (the Logic for ENDS, WAYS and MEANS)
original life cycles. Keeping these operational and maintenance has become cost-intensive. The
lack of spares and high maintenance costs involved induce a critical drag into our future fleet The policy guidance provided by the higher authority, national interests and national security
objectives, assessment of our strategic environment and our corresponding focal areas of interest
advances. Eventually, some of these platforms will have to be phased out in order to provide for underscored the devising of our strategic imperatives or objectives for the SLN. Identification of
new acquisitions. There needs to be a proper appraisal of the respective roles expected from each these strategic objectives (ENDS) reflects our focus on root purposes and causes and an
platform and prescribing the right role-task-platform synchronization. These need to be gradually appreciation of the strategic environment. These objectives on accomplishment are to result in
phased out before transforming into serious liabilities. Similarly, the FPVs are also limited in desired effects and the achievement of the desired end states as a nation.
deployment considering seaworthiness. Articulation of the strategic concepts (WAYS) explains ‘how’ the end state is to be achieved
through the employment of instruments of power at our disposal. Thus, the following rationale
The IPCs have seriously become redundant and incapable of responding to the perennial non- approach was undertaken in order to identify suitable, viable and acceptable strategic concepts and
traditional threats existent from the North-western coast to the Northern coast. The SLN needs to means with low or no risks in articulating a new orientation for the future SLN.
rethink the employment of a suitable all-weather platform/platforms along these coastal waters to
deter and deny IUU fishing and illicit activities. Table 11.2

Overall, the entire SLN fleet is severely short of credible surface, subsurface or anti-air ENDS, WAYS and MEANS Approach
capabilities. They acutely lack versatility and flexibility which is essential for a balanced Navy to
achieve the desired effect in an object area. To offset the high costs involved in operating ships, Enduring Needs/ Desired Operational Strategic Concept Resources
aircraft on the high seas can be leveraged through advanced technology. Strategic Objectives Effect Challenges & (WAYS) (MEANS)
Basin Structure (doing the right Deficiencies (Doing things right (Costs)
things or or efficiency)
There is an apparent incoherence of our Basin Structure (ashore establishments, berthing & effectiveness)
maintenance facilities) to meet the future demands in the maritime domain. Across the existing 07 (ENDS)
Area Authorities, there are 45 Commissioned bases, 03 Naval Deployments, 129 Detachments, 25 1. Achieving Maritime MDA in our Lack of credible This should be through Versatile and
Naval Sub-units and 337 Coastal Observation Points (COPs). In a sense, SLN has overstretched Domain Awareness maritime region three dimensional patrols, surveillance, flexible surface
itself along the coastal regions which had become even worse following the establishment of COPs (MDA) and beyond in all capability and technical monitoring and and air platforms
making administration, sustenance, logistics, communications and training arduous. In a security weather relevant information sharing An MPA can be an
sense, these have become our critical vulnerabilities. However, we need to strengthen our coastal conditions investments Maintaining a credible effective
security operations and missions ensuring our territorial integrity, sovereignty and the pursuit of Real-time MDA deterrent effect through a surveillance tool,
our national interests. capability and persistent presence in our flying the EEZ
capacity littoral and EEZ often in less than
Further, there also exists a more worrying phenomenon considering available berthing facilities, covering a vast span of an hour and
provision of shore power, fresh water and waste disposal at any given time for our existing and Less effective area in all weather patrolling
future fleet forecasts. Given the associated annual maintenance and major overhauls and our own maritime air conditions. Visible thousands of
capacity to undertake the same, the Navy indeed faces a dilemma. surveillance presence deters lawless square miles of sea
capability (so far behaviours more quickly than
People zero seizure rate ships
since induction) Increasing and investing
Our personnel are not only for ships/craft but essential to support our fleet from ashore. Given our in MDA capabilities UAVs/ UUVs
classic role, a significant number of personnel, over 6,000 are employed for non-naval roles and Increasing threat (IFC, MRCC) might be cost
tasks from maintaining RO plants, non-security related duties at religious places and other by resurgence of effective and a
construction work. Further, there is a cadre of 6,472 personnel under the Volunteer Special Scheme piracy and drone Existing maritime force multiplier
(VSS) that represents a considerable portion of our overall complement. Further, the Navy attacks to global surveillance asset to be Real time satellite
commons
employed as per SLN
maintains an active Volunteer Naval Force (VNF) of 11,157 including 379 Officers.
especially in the mission requirements / imagery
Meanwhile, our work spaces, accommodation areas are highly congested and provisions are IOR (Red Sea alternative is to train
inadequate to provide for significant intrinsic or extrinsic benefits that are essential factors in area). This shall SLN crew to man
maintaining a high status of morale among our men and women. These need to be immediately persist till 2030 aircraft and separate vote
addressed or ignorance to do so will result in a ‘butterfly effect’ that would be detrimental to the allocated for SLAF for
organization both short and long terms. We must be receptive, proactive and pragmatic in our maintenance etc.
approach to these worrying signs already visible in the horizon.

Thus the synchronization of our people, ships and basin structure should complement in building
our credibility in the execution of missions in our focal area of interests.

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