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NAVSTRAT-2030

Meanwhile, the FMVs, the FGBs and the FACs are serving and deployed beyond their respective
original life cycles. Keeping these operational and maintenance has become cost-intensive. The
lack of spares and high maintenance costs involved induce a critical drag into our future fleet
advances. Eventually, some of these platforms will have to be phased out in order to provide for
new acquisitions. There needs to be a proper appraisal of the respective roles expected from each
platform and prescribing the right role-task-platform synchronization. These need to be gradually
phased out before transforming into serious liabilities. Similarly, the FPVs are also limited in
deployment considering seaworthiness.

The IPCs have seriously become redundant and incapable of responding to the perennial non-
traditional threats existent from the North-western coast to the Northern coast. The SLN needs to
rethink the employment of a suitable all-weather platform/platforms along these coastal waters to
deter and deny IUU fishing and illicit activities.

Overall, the entire SLN fleet is severely short of credible surface, subsurface or anti-air
capabilities. They acutely lack versatility and flexibility which is essential for a balanced Navy to
achieve the desired effect in an object area. To offset the high costs involved in operating ships,
aircraft on the high seas can be leveraged through advanced technology.
Basin Structure

There is an apparent incoherence of our Basin Structure (ashore establishments, berthing &
maintenance facilities) to meet the future demands in the maritime domain. Across the existing 07
Area Authorities, there are 45 Commissioned bases, 03 Naval Deployments, 129 Detachments, 25
Naval Sub-units and 337 Coastal Observation Points (COPs). In a sense, SLN has overstretched
itself along the coastal regions which had become even worse following the establishment of COPs
making administration, sustenance, logistics, communications and training arduous. In a security
sense, these have become our critical vulnerabilities. However, we need to strengthen our coastal
security operations and missions ensuring our territorial integrity, sovereignty and the pursuit of
our national interests.

Further, there also exists a more worrying phenomenon considering available berthing facilities,
provision of shore power, fresh water and waste disposal at any given time for our existing and
future fleet forecasts. Given the associated annual maintenance and major overhauls and our own
capacity to undertake the same, the Navy indeed faces a dilemma.

People

Our personnel are not only for ships/craft but essential to support our fleet from ashore. Given our
classic role, a significant number of personnel, over 6,000 are employed for non-naval roles and
tasks from maintaining RO plants, non-security related duties at religious places and other
construction work. Further, there is a cadre of 6,472 personnel under the Volunteer Special Scheme
(VSS) that represents a considerable portion of our overall complement. Further, the Navy
maintains an active Volunteer Naval Force (VNF) of 11,157 including 379 Officers.

Meanwhile, our work spaces, accommodation areas are highly congested and provisions are
inadequate to provide for significant intrinsic or extrinsic benefits that are essential factors in
maintaining a high status of morale among our men and women. These need to be immediately
addressed or ignorance to do so will result in a ‘butterfly effect’ that would be detrimental to the
organization both short and long terms. We must be receptive, proactive and pragmatic in our
approach to these worrying signs already visible in the horizon.

Thus the synchronization of our people, ships and basin structure should complement in building
our credibility in the execution of missions in our focal area of interests.

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